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A New Agreement between the EU and Russia: 
Why, what and when? 
Michael Emerson, Fabrizio Tassinari and Marius Vahl* 
 
Abstract: The 10
th anniversary of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia, 
which falls on 1 December 2007, is already prompting thoughts on whether and how to replace it. This raises basic 
issues about the form, purpose and content of bilateral treaties in the context of an integrating Europe. The following 
scenarios are discussed: 
1.  Retire the PCA without replacement  
2. Extend the status quo 
3. Extend the status quo, adding a Political Declaration on Strategic Partnership 
4. Replace the PCA with a short Treaty on Strategic Partnership 
5. Replace the PCA with a comprehensive Treaty on Strategic Partnership 
6. Negotiate a Treaty of Strategic Union 
We argue that the model of the comprehensive multi-sectoral treaty, well known to the EU and its neighbours that 
aspire to membership, is not suited to the case of Russia, which is not an applicant for membership. Attempts to 
produce weaker derivatives of this model result in long-winded and pretentious texts that are thin or devoid of 
legally-binding substance. The treaty form also involves extremely long and risky ratification procedures on the 
side of the EU and its member states, and is extremely inflexible, even possibly becoming outdated before entry 
into force. For the foreseeable future, it would be best to focus efforts on concrete, sector-specific agreements.    
We advocate a three-stage concept, starting with an extended status quo in the short-run (scenario 2), trying to 
give useful effect to the four Common Spaces agreed in May 2005 and various sector-specific agreements. This 
could lead on in the medium-term to a Political Declaration on Strategic Partnership (scenario 3) to revise and 
update priorities after Russia’s WTO accession and more experience with the four Common Spaces. In the long 
term, we would like to see a Treaty of Strategic Union (scenario 6), as and when there is a greater convergence 
and mutual trust on matters of political values.  
 
1.  Introduction: The ‘2007 question
1 
The so-called ‘2007 question’ arises because on 1 
December 2007 the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia 
reaches the 10
th anniversary of its entry into force. 
Actually the PCA is even older, since it was 
signed on 24 June 1994, by President Yeltsin in 
Corfu, and the ratification process took over three 
years.  
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1 This paper is a response to two articles published in 
the latest issue of Russia in Global Affairs (Vol. 4, No. 
2, April-June 2006): “Toward a Strategic Alliance” by 
Timofei Bordachev and “Russia-EU Quandary 2007” by 
Nadezhda Arbatova. We are grateful to them for 
stimulating the writing of this paper and to Valeria 
Murycheva for her research assistance. 
There seems to be a presumption in official circles that 
there should be a new Agreement to replace the PCA, 
even though there is no compelling legal argument to do 
something. On the contrary, the existing PCA will live on 
automatically in the absence of any agreement to do the 
contrary. Art. 106 of the PCA reads:  
“This Agreement is concluded for an initial period of 10 
years. The Agreement shall be automatically renewed 
year by year provided that neither Party gives the other 
Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement at 
least six months before it expires”.  
The simplest reason why there should be a new 
agreement is that much has changed since the PCA was 
negotiated in both the EU in its membership, policies and 
competences, and in Russia since the early days of the 
post-communist and post-Soviet period. It can be argued 
therefore that the PCA is obsolete.  
There are, however, more precise motivations to 
negotiate a new agreement. There is an unease on the part 
of both sides over the status quo, which has become a 
complex but also irritable relationship.  
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2.  Interests and values 
The EU-Russian relationship has become a complex and 
rich one as the post-Soviet Russia has opened itself to the 
world and especially its European neighbours. The EU 
and Russia find themselves interacting on a huge agenda 
of common interests and concerns. This is illustrated by 
the fact that the Russian mission to the EU in Brussels is 
now believed to be Russia’s biggest embassy in the 
world, staffed with diplomats and experts covering every 
aspect of the wider European integration process. 
It appears that the European Commission and the 
Russian government are setting up no less than 40 
bilateral dialogue groups on specifically identified 
policy domains, which suggests that the two 
administrations are getting to know each other 
extremely well. Could this also lead, in the terminology 
of political science, to ‘Europeanisation’ by 
‘socialisation’?   
At the top level, however, the relationship has also 
become irritable, essentially because of different world 
views of the two parties. In the summary language of 
international relations theory, this reflects different 
positions in the realist-idealist spectrum. Russia today 
behaves as a predominantly realpolitik actor, with little 
recognisable trace of what EU citizens consider to be 
political values. The EU advocates for itself and its 
partners much more of a values-based conception of 
public policy, both domestically and in foreign policy. 
According to Timofei Bordachev, Russia now aspires to 
an agreement that would reflect its specificity – its size, 
geo-political significance and unwillingness to be an EU 
associate that automatically accepts alignment on EU 
norms. Russia’s idea of being an ‘equal partner’ with 
the EU is reflected in an increasing self-confidence and 
assertiveness on the international stage, boosted by the 
trump cards it can play in the energy sector. For some at 
least, e.g. Nadia Arbatova, the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
Russia in terms of political and societal norms remains a 
motivation. But Russia has in any case some quite 
pragmatic interests in Europe, for example freedom of 
movement for its people – businessmen, students, 
tourists, officials, etc. - in the EU, as has been illustrated 
by its strong demands for visa facilitation.   
The EU for its part is uneasy over political and foreign 
policy developments in Russia, which are perceived to 
be increasingly divergent from the EU’s conception of 
European values. This ‘values gap’ is perceived to have 
widened especially during President Putin’s second term 
in office as a result of two influences, both internal and 
external.  
The first, internal development has been the 
strengthening of the Kremlin’s ‘power vertical’, the 
absence of  pluralist party politics, the erosion of media 
and NGO freedoms, and the lack of an independent 
judiciary and rule of law. President Putin was widely 
credited with having reversed the comparative chaos of 
governance in Russia under Yeltsin during his first term 
of office. But he is now perceived in Europe as having 
gone unnecessarily and undesirably far in reverting to a 
semi-authoritarian and only pseudo-democratic state. 
These tendencies have interacted with the huge incentives 
presented by Russia’s oil-gas resources to create a rent-
controlling and distributing regime.    
The second, external but related development has been 
the emergence of the new Russian geo-politics, in which 
the Kremlin-Gazprom complex exerts pressure on former 
Soviet states bordering now both Russia and the EU 
using a combination of commercial-energy and politico-
diplomatic instruments. Deputy Prime Minister Sergei 
Ivanov has set this out in writing in a text he placed in a 
Western newspaper (see Box 1), in terms that appear to 
aim at a cross between a new Yalta and the old Monroe 
Doctrine. Maybe he wishes to go down in history as 
originator of an Ivanov Doctrine. But, not surprisingly, 
this doctrine is fundamentally unacceptable to the EU and 
no less so to independent states such as Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia. The values gap has – in a typical 
EU view – become distressingly and alarmingly wide 
when Russia punishes former Soviet states with gas 
supply or wine import sanctions for trying to become 
more democratic or simply not being ‘Russia-compliant’.      
Box 1. “The New Russian Security Doctrine” 
by Sergei Ivanov, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence of Russia [Extract] 
Russia is not itching for war. War is never by choice. 
Right now, there is no conflict or dispute outside the 
country that could be seen as a direct military threat. 
However, to ignore the future is irresponsible. We need 
to look several moves ahead – on all levels, from military 
planning to a strategic vision of the future of armed 
conflict. We need to consider the implications of the 
‘uncertainty factor’ as well as of the high level of existing 
threats. By uncertainty we mean a political or military-
political conflict or process that has a potential to pose a 
direct threat to Russia’s security, or to change the geo-
political reality in a region of Russia’s strategic interest. 
Our top concern is the internal situation in some members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the club of 
former Soviet republics, and the regions around them.  
Source: The Wall Street Journal, 11 January 2006. 
The EU in principle seeks a policy of maximum 
practicable engagement with Russia. It has strategic 
economic interests in maintaining reliable energy 
supplies from Russia, and strategic political and security 
interests in having a cooperative rather than conflictual 
relationship. The EU hopes for some kind of 
‘socialisation effect’, which in due course would see 
Russian society, private enterprises and government 
converge on European standards and values.   
Could a new agreement contribute to these objectives? 
The question may be asked, but the answer is not self-
evident. Opinions within the EU vary, with the familiar A New Agreement between the EU and Russia? | 3 
 
spectrum of hard vs soft positions. The hard position says 
that the EU must stand firm on its political principles, and 
that to agree to Russian demands at this stage for an 
ambitious new agreement would amount to appeasement 
of an increasingly undemocratic and arrogant regime. The 
soft position would give greater credence to possible 
socialisation effects, or simply give primary weight to 
economic interests with little regard to political values.  
Views within the EU are certainly not static, while Russia 
and the EU have constantly to interact in response to 
events. To track the evolution of EU perceptions of 
Russia as a partner state is of course difficult or 
speculative. However it seems possible to identify some 
evolution in these perceptions. At the time of the EU’s 
2004 enlargement, there was a marked widening in the 
spectrum of perceptions of Russia. ‘New Europe’ could 
be heard saying “the only language Russia understands is 
that of strength, and we know Russia best”. ‘Old Europe’, 
represented by the Chirac-Schroeder-Berlusconi trio, 
gave priority to personalised diplomacy with President 
Putin in pursuit of various commercial and diplomatic 
objectives. Berlusconi’s role as EU President in 2003 
carried this to reductio ad absurdum levels, famously 
nominating himself as advocate of Putin’s Chechnya 
policy in a press conference at the end of an EU-Russia 
summit. However, it seems that these extreme 
divergences have narrowed in more recent times. The 
new member states have moved more towards the centre 
of the spectrum, maybe through their deeper socialisation 
within the workings of the EU, while the Chirac-
Schroeder-Berlusconi trio has now dwindled to one, with 
the Merkel-Prodi pair apparently more centrist than their 
predecessors in their positions on the interests-values 
spectrum.   
3.  Forms of agreement in international and 
European regimes 
International regimes these days take many different 
forms and structures. The comprehensive bilateral treaty 
of the kind the EU has developed with many of its 
neighbouring states is only one particular case, which has 
been driven by the unique nature of the European 
integration process, including the perspective of leading 
to EU membership.  
At the other end of the spectrum stands the EU-US 
model. This relationship has no overarching bilateral 
treaty at all but rather is anchored in several multilateral 
treaties that form the backbone of the post-second world 
war multilateral order: the UN family, the WTO, NATO, 
IMF, IBRD and OECD. These organisations were 
designed first of all to order trans-Atlantic relations, and 
to establish the rules of the game that suited the advanced 
western democracies. These rules and organisations were 
so substantial and successful that the idea of a 
comprehensive bilateral treaty between the US and its 
European allies has been considered superfluous.  
These multilateral organisations were also designed for 
the huge asymmetry of the early post-world war order, 
namely to organise relations between the US as the only 
global power and the many small or medium-sized 
European states. This asymmetry has been most evident 
in NATO, where the principle of sovereign equality of all 
member states stands alongside the obviously dominant 
position of the US.  
This asymmetry has itself become increasingly obsolete, 
however, as the EU has progressively developed over the 
last decades. Some of these older multilateral 
organisations have become embarrassingly ill-adapted to 
the new situation. The many medium and small European 
states all have their formal place in them on a basis of 
sovereign equality, yet they have less and less to say 
beyond referring to positions of the EU. The EU 
institutions are themselves only patchily represented, for 
example, through observer status only, or through the 
voice of the rotating presidency. 
As these organisations (such as the OECD and the 
OSCE) failed to adapt fully to changing needs, there has 
been a tendency not to abolish or even reform them (all 
too difficult), but to supplement them with new informal 
structures, of which the G7 summits have been the prime 
example. The G7 started with hardly any EU presence, 
but soon the big four EU states were obliged to accept, 
under pressure from the smaller non-represented member 
states, to have the Commission included as full 
participant. More recently, of course, the G7 became G8, 
with Russia taking on in 2006 the presidency role for the 
first time. The G8 also now tends to extend partial 
invitations to new world powers (China, India, Brazil). 
All this has happened without any legal agreement or 
treaty, which has facilitated the organic evolution of this 
quasi-institution. It is a reminder of the disadvantages of 
over-using rigid, legally entrenched treaty agreements in 
an ever changing world, and notably for avoiding legally-
binding formalism where there is not a functional 
necessity for it.  
The US and Russia have not had an overarching 
agreement, but have still made a number of exceptionally 
important sector-specific treaties, of which the 
outstanding examples have been the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II).    
The EU’s model of the comprehensive bilateral 
agreement was initiated with the so-called ‘Europe 
Agreements’ made with the Central and Eastern 
European states, in response to their applications for full 
membership at the beginning of the post-communist 
period. These treaties were accordingly anticipating 
subsequent accession. They were effectively a 
comprehensive and legally-binding training programme 
for the candidates. There was no question about the final 
objective, and so the use of the EU acquis as the legal 
and normative reference was readily accepted.  
This model was then adapted with not only the PCAs. It 
was seen also later with the Stabilisation and Association 4 | Emerson, Tassinari & Vahl 
 
Agreements (SAAs) with the western Balkans states that 
did not have candidate status, but did have acknowledged 
‘membership perspectives’. It has been seen again more 
recently with the Action Plans of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is open for 
European CIS states (except for Russia which has 
rejected the formula) and the Southern Mediterranean 
states of the Barcelona Process with which the EU has 
concluded comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements. These several models have in 
common with the Europe Agreements that they all start 
with the same structure of topics, which in turn find their 
origin in the EU acquis. Reflecting the advance of 
European integration into the fields of justice and home 
affairs and foreign, security and defence policy since the 
early 1990s, the SAAs in particular are broader in 
coverage than the earlier Europe Agreements. 
The Action Plans of the ENP are not themselves treaties 
binding under international law, but just jointly-agreed 
policy documents of intentions. However, it is anticipated 
that they may lead to ‘Neighbourhood Agreements’, i.e. 
treaties whose likely content may be pre-figured by the 
Action Plans. Moreover, several of the European states 
concerned (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) declare that full 
membership is their long-term objective, even if this is 
not acknowledged at this stage by the EU itself. In the 
case of Ukraine, it was agreed at summit level in 
December 2005 that the two parties will work towards an 
‘enhanced agreement’ (i.e. a treaty) as soon as Ukraine 
accedes to the WTO, with a presumption that a free trade 
agreement would be a core economic component of a 
comprehensive treaty. The European Parliament in April 
2006 adopted a resolution calling for an Association 
Agreement with Ukraine, which was immediately 
translated in the Ukrainian media as meaning Associate 
Membership. A new ‘Enhanced Agreement’ with 
Ukraine is currently under discussion in the EU 
institutions and between the EU and Ukraine, and 
negotiations on this agreement may commence as early as 
the end of 2006.     
There are also some special cases where the EU has very 
close relations with European neighbours without the 
legal base of a comprehensive agreement. This concerns 
in particular Switzerland, where the regime that emerged 
over the last decade was to a degree an accidental and 
improvised response to unexpected referendum results. It 
has become nonetheless a model of wider interest for 
students of the conceivable options for systemic 
relationships with the EU.  Indeed, in large part due to the 
pillar structure of the EU, a growing number of sectoral 
agreements are concluded with non-member states, 
although, in contrast to the Swiss model, these are 
concluded alongside (and often in the framework of) the 
comprehensive agreements.  
Comparisons with these various forms of ‘association 
agreement’ serve to highlight Russia’s unease with the 
PCA for reasons that go beyond its obsolescence. As 
Bordachev says quite clearly, Russia does not want to be 
an associate of the EU. It wants to be its equal partner, 
with no presumptions about Russia’s possible 
convergence of the EU acquis, which might be seen as 
implying their normative superiority. On the other hand, 
Russia did, in May 2005, enter into the Four Common 
Spaces agreement with the EU (economics, justice and 
home affairs, education and culture, and external 
security). In fact, these documents are not so different 
from the Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, with the major exception they exclude the big 
missing common space – that of democracy and human 
rights.  
Comparison of agreements such as the PCA on the one 
hand, and the four common space agreements and action 
plans on the other hand, raises the issue of legal form. 
Agreements such as the PCA are treaties, i.e. having the 
highest status in international law and being binding in 
their content. The Four Common Spaces and Action Plan 
documents are agreements signed by the two parties, but 
are not subject to ratification, which would give them the 
status of treaties.  
Bordachev emphasises that any new agreement or 
package of documents “cannot fall within the same 
‘system of coordinates’ as the EU’s present practice of 
formalising relations with neighbouring states.” 
However, any agreement concluded by the EU with 
Russia must be based on the EU treaties. International 
agreements are mentioned in numerous articles in both of 
the main treaties, the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (EC) and the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the EU is thus faced with several options and 
choices as to the legal base of any new agreement with 
Russia (see Box 2).  
On the EU side, the legal issues are particularly complex 
for comprehensive agreements that mix issues where the 
European Community has exclusive competence such as 
for trade policy, others areas such as energy where the 
competences are shared between the European 
Community and member states, and other areas such as 
foreign and security policy where the formal competence 
lies mainly with the Union as such and the member 
states.  
If the EU and Russia were to embark upon the 
negotiation of a comprehensive agreement covering 
roughly the policy areas covered in the Four Common 
Spaces, it would be a first example for the EU of a 
‘multi-pillar’ agreement. There are different procedures 
for the conclusion of Community and Union agreements, 
set out in Art. 300 EC and Art. 24 TEU, respectively. The 
Treaties provide no clear guidelines as to how such a 
‘cross-pillar’ agreement should be concluded. There are 
for instance no provisions in the Treaties on the 
negotiations should be conducted. In order to comply 
with the Treaties, it would have to be negotiated by both 
the Commission (the normal practice for mixed 
association agreements) and the Presidency (which 
concludes Union agreements on CFSP and JHA).  A New Agreement between the EU and Russia? | 5 
 
Box 2. Legal aspects of an upgraded agreement between the EU and Russia 
A European Community agreement? 
While treaty revisions in recent decades have added to the number of provisions providing for international agreements, 
the two original provisions – for trade and tariff agreements (Art. 133 EC) and association agreements (Art. 310 EC) – 
remain the dominant types of Community agreements concluded by the EU, with many sector-specific agreements also 
concluded on the basis of Art. 310). The PCA is a trade and tariff agreement (i.e. based on Art. 133 EC). 
Comprehensive agreements with third countries are increasingly concluded as association agreements. This is the case not 
just with accession candidates but also with Southern Mediterranean partners, and not just with neighbours but also with 
countries as farther away Chile. There are mainly two reasons for this. First, association agreements are not limited to any 
particular policy area, as are trade and tariff agreements and other sector-specific agreements provided for in the treaties. 
Secondly, it is preferred by the member states as it requires unanimity in the Council. Trade and tariff agreements by 
contrast (as well as some other sector-specific agreements), are adopted in the Council by qualified majority vote.  
The assent of the European Parliament is required for association agreements, but not for agreements concluded on the 
basis of Art. 133 EC. Such assent is also required when an agreement establishes “a specific institutional framework by 
organising cooperation procedures” and/ or have budgetary implications for the Community.  
A mixed agreement? 
Most agreements between the EU and third countries, including the PCA, are concluded by both the Community and the 
Member States acting jointly, even if there are no specific provisions in the treaties for such ‘mixed agreements’. The 
principal reason is to enable the EU to conduct political dialogue – which the Community as such does not have the 
competence to conduct – within the framework of the agreement. Mixed agreements are mostly negotiated under the 
Community method, although there is no formally established practice for negotiation of mixed agreements, and in 
practice they are ratified by the national parliaments of all member states. The PCA is a mixed agreement, and a new 
supposedly more ambitious agreement would surely also be a mixed agreement.  
A European Union agreement? 
Art. 24 of the Treaty on European Union provides for international agreements to be concluded by the Union as such in 
areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
(the aspects of justice and home affairs covered by the third pillar of the EU). Two of the four Road Maps are dedicated to 
these two policy areas, and these topics would presumably be included in a new agreement. Such an agreement would 
likely be concluded between Russia and the Union as such, i.e. based also on Art. 24 TEU. However, an alternative would 
be to leave these areas out of the new ‘comprehensive’ agreement and conclude separate agreements in these policy areas 
in parallel. 
This also affects the ratification process, since with 
‘mixed’ agreements there has to be ratification by all 25 
member states, both the governments represented in the 
Council, national, and in some cases sub-national 
parliaments, as well as the assent of the European 
Parliament. This heavy ratification procedure in any case 
means considerable delay, and therefore rigidity. The EU 
now with 25 and soon 27 member states also faces 
increased risks of one or other national parliaments failing 
to ratify, and thus negating years of negotiation work. 
This risk seems especially pertinent in the case of a future 
agreement with Russia, given the wide dispersion of 
political sentiments towards Russia in the enlarged EU.  
4.  The-EU-Russia status quo  
4.1  The Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) 
The PCA has a similar structure and scope in terms of 
policy areas covered as other agreements, such as the 
Europe Agreements and the EEA, concluded in the same 
period (see Annex 1 for the main headings of the PCA). 
The commitments are much more limited in the PCA 
than in the Europe Agreements, because Russia was only 
at the beginning of its post-communist transition, not an 
EU accession candidate, and lacking WTO membership 
and, at the time, even market economy status. The 
political dialogue, on the other hand, is more extensive, 
with bi-annual summits in addition to the typical 
ministerial meetings. 
Apart from Title III, which deals with trade in goods, and 
the general and institutional principles and frameworks 
set out in Titles I, II and XI, most of the provisions of the 
PCA consist of vague commitments to ‘cooperate’ in 
various areas. A frequent complaint is that many of the 
provisions remain un-implemented, although the precise 
number is uncertain, as the vagueness of many of the 
provisions makes it sometimes difficult to determine 
whether they can be said to be ‘implemented’ or not.  
The relative weakness of the PCA regime since its entry 
into force in late 1997 seems to be testified by efforts to 
deepen and broaden the bilateral relationship further, as 
reflected in two sets of documents adopted: first, in 1999, 
the EU and then Russian strategy documents on the 
future of the bilateral relationship; and secondly, in 2005, 
the set of Road Maps for the development of Four 
Common Spaces.  6 | Emerson, Tassinari & Vahl 
 
4.2  The strategy documents 
The 1999 Common Strategy on Russia (Annex 2) was the 
first experiment with a new CFSP instrument introduced 
by the Amsterdam Treaty. It was an attempt to upgrade 
the EU-Russian relationship beyond the PCA. The EU’s 
document was unilateral, through which the EU 
institutions and the member states sought to define more 
precisely what they wanted from the relationship with 
Russia. Its content also reflected the development of the 
EU itself, with much more prominence given to issues of 
foreign policy and matters of cross-border crime as well 
as democracy and the rule of law.   
Russia for its part replied later in 1999 with its ‘Medium-
Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the 
Russian Federation and the European Union’ (Annex 3). 
This was at least a statement by Russia to the effect that 
the relationship was not to be defined only in a unilateral 
document by the EU. 
A first review of the process by the High Representative 
in late 2000 was not encouraging. Although the 
‘Common Strategy’ was renewed for a year upon the end 
of its four-year duration in June 2003, it was quietly 
ignored and allowed to expire the following year. The 
Russia document has met a fate similar to that of the 
‘Common Strategy’. Although due to expire only in 
2010, it has been rarely referred to in the bilateral 
relations in the following years.   
4.3  The Road Maps for the Four Common 
Spaces 
Following the decisions to create a Common European 
Economic Space in May 2001, subsequently expanded to 
Four Common Spaces in May 2003, the EU and Russia 
adopted four Road Maps for these Four Common Spaces 
in May 2005. The Common Spaces reflect the extent to 
which the relationship has evolved beyond the areas of 
cooperation envisaged in the PCA. Two of the Common 
Spaces are dedicated to ‘external’ and ‘internal’ security 
issues respectively, corresponding to the common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) and the justice and home 
affairs agendas in the EU. These are relatively new policy 
areas in the EU that existed only in embryonic form at the 
time of the signing of the PCA. 
The parties are currently in the process of establishing the 
numerous ‘dialogues’, mainly on economic regulatory 
issues, called for in the Road Maps. An important 
question of interpretation and evaluation is where all 
these dialogue groups are heading. In particular are they 
preparing the ground for the regulatory convergence 
announced in the ‘Common European Economic Space’, 
and if so, convergence on which norms and standards? 
The story that seems to emerge is one of a two-level 
Russian discourse and practice. At the top political level, 
the discourse is all about being equal partners, with 
silence over matters of alignment on EU norms and 
standards. At the more technical and expert level, the 
practice seems to become one of far more alignment on 
EU norms and standards, especially where they can stand 
as proxy for wider international standards, than the 
political strategists suggest. The interpretation can be that 
across the very wide range of business interests there are 
many sectors where it makes sense for Russian 
enterprises, or the Russian regulator to adopt European 
standards. This would surely be the case, for example, for 
product standards and accounting, audit and financial 
regulation standards for enterprises seeking access to 
European and Western markets for trade, investment or 
capital market (IPO) access. This is a complex process of 
case-by-case and autonomous decisions by Russian 
government departments and business interests to choose 
where and when to align on common (i.e. European 
and/or international) standards. It is not evident whether 
the Russian policy-maker even has a clear idea of what 
the overall score is on these accounts, which means that 
the gap between discourse and practice may indeed be 
substantial.  
The Road Maps for the Four Common Spaces also have 
indicated a long list of sector-specific agreements that 
would be negotiated (a selection is presented in Box 3). 
This means a lot of work in progress, which will be a task 
of several years.     
Box 3. Agreements envisaged in the Road Maps on the 
Four Common Spaces  
Common Economic Space 
Investment-related issues 
Veterinary  
Fisheries  
GALILEO/GLONASS cooperation 
Trade in nuclear materials 
Freedom, security and justice 
Visa-facilitation 
Readmission 
Mutual legal assistance 
Europol-Russia operational agreement 
Eurojust-Russia agreement 
Judicial cooperation in civil matters 
External security 
Framework on legal and financial aspects of crisis 
Management operations 
Information protection 
4.4  World Trade Organisation  
Russia’s WTO accession process has taken much longer 
than initially expected. Russia applied in 1993, and at the 
time of the signing of the PCA, it was envisaged that 
accession could occur as early as 1998 or 1999. By 
contrast, at the time of writing it seems unlikely that 
Russia will be able to accede by the end of 2006, the 
most recent date suggested by Russian officials. This 
delay has put a brake on the development of the trading 
relationship between the EU and Russia, most notably by A New Agreement between the EU and Russia? | 7 
 
postponing indefinitely talks on the creation of an 
eventual EU-Russian free trade area, one of the most 
ambitious projects mentioned in the PCA. The EU has 
agreed bilaterally with Russia on the terms of its 
accession, but the agreement of other WTO member 
states is still lacking, including the United States. 
Moreover, Russia’s trade sanctions against Ukraine (farm 
produce), Moldova (wine) and Georgia (wine and 
drinking water) in the first half of 2006 would almost 
certainly having been illegal by WTO standards, given 
that adequate justification for these restrictive measures 
has not been supplied. These actions are further pushing 
back the prospects of Russia’s WTO accession, with 
high-level US officials making critical remarks in public.
1  
The intentions of the EU and Russia on the question of 
eventual free trade are not made explicit in the Roadmap 
for the Common Economic Space, since WTO accession 
is the next step in any case. However there is a tendency 
for the EU to extend its set of bilateral free trade 
agreements, especially for nearby countries. In particular 
the Commission has been contracting a number of 
feasibility studies on the content and consequences of 
free trade with major trade partners, such as Ukraine, 
India and Korea. A first study
2 has recently been 
completed by a CEPS-led consortium on Ukraine, for 
which negotiations are set to begin as soon as Ukraine 
enters the WTO – now expected in 2006. The accent on 
the word ‘deep’ in the title implies that there will be 
many detailed topics for negotiation. As and when these 
negotiations take real shape, there will be impetus to 
review the same agenda between the EU with Russia. 
4.5  The Energy Charter Treaty and Protocol 
on Transit 
In the energy sector, the EU and Russia are formally 
engaged in the Energy Charter Treaty, but in practice 
have not reached a political consensus on the actual 
degree of commitment to the obligations of the Treaty 
and implementation of its provisions.  
The European Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 has sought 
to provide the political, technical and legal foundations 
for East-West cooperation in the energy sector. The 
Treaty covers the protection and promotion of foreign 
investment in the energy sector, free trade in energy 
goods and services (based on WTO rules and practice), 
energy transit, energy efficiency and environment, and 
multilateral mechanisms of settlement investor-to-state or 
government-to-government disputes. By now, 51 
                                                        
1 See remarks by Vice-President Dick Cheney at the Vilnius 
Conference, 4 May 2006 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html). 
2 The Prospect of Deep Free Trade between the European Union 
and Ukraine, Michael Emerson, Huw Edwards, Ildar Gazizullin, 
Matthias Lücke, Daniel Müller-Jentsch, Vira Nanivska, Valeriy 
Pyatnytskiy, Andreas Schneider, Rainer Schweickert, Olexandr 
Shevtsov and Olga Shumylo, CEPS, April 2006. 
countries plus the European Communities have signed 
the Treaty; 46 countries, including the EU member states, 
have ratified it. Russia has signed but postponed the 
ratification and is currently applying the Treaty on a 
provisional basis.  
Russia has been persistently called upon by the EU and 
member states to ratify the Treaty and also proceed with 
negotiations on a related Transit Protocol. These issues 
have risen to the top of the political agenda in the first 
half of 2006, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
supply crisis of January. Moreover, the prospect of the 
G8 summit to be hosted by Russia in July opens the 
possibility for outstanding issues to be tackled at the 
highest level.  
At the time of writing, it is unclear whether negotiations 
can reach the point that Russia will ratify the Energy 
Charter Treaty and agree to sign the Transit Protocol. The 
Russian position in public is heard through two voices, 
the first being that of the energy minister and the second 
that of Gazprom spokesmen. The government says that 
there are just some relatively technical concerns to be 
resolved. The spokesmen of Gazprom, which is majority- 
controlled by the government, are utterly dismissive of 
the Energy Charter. The key articles of the draft Transit 
Protocol are reproduced in Annex 5. Concretely, Art. 8 
would require Gazprom to make its pipeline capacity 
open for transit for third country suppliers, such as from 
Turkmenistan to Ukraine or the EU. Art. 20 is effectively 
addressing obligations to the EU (the language is about 
regional organisations) to make its internal distribution 
networks available to third country suppliers on no less 
favourable terms than for domestic suppliers.  
These are extremely important matters for both sides. The 
fact that negotiations are taking place in the first half of 
2006 under very special circumstances (Ukraine crisis, 
G8) illustrates two important points about how to 
organise the EU-Russia relationship. First, the main texts 
and treaties are multilateral, not bilateral. Second, the 
impetus to conduct substantive negotiations came at a 
particular point in time from a specific political context 
that forced the issues to the top level. Both factors are 
warnings to those who might have excessive expectations 
for the plausible content of a comprehensive bilateral 
treaty, addressing so many issues at the same time, and 
intended to last for many years.  
In the event that the Charter is ratified and the Transit 
Protocol agreed there would surely, however, follow 
renewed impetus for negotiations under the energy 
dialogue heading, leading to various specific agreements.  
Following Russia’s ratification in 2004 of the Kyoto 
Protocol on global warming, with its overlapping energy 
and environmental policy domains, the country has 
become a full player in detailing implementation 
measures and in the recent debates on the post-Kyoto 
regime to be devised for 2012 onwards. There will surely 
be intense bilateral dialogue between the EU and Russia 
on possible designs for the follow-on regime. Also there 8 | Emerson, Tassinari & Vahl 
 
are likely to emerge many issues requiring bilateral 
operational agreements in this field.   
4.6  Other agreements and initiatives 
The EU and Russia have concluded several limited 
sectoral agreements since the entry into force of the PCA 
in 1997. This includes agreements envisaged in the PCA, 
such as the agreements on trade in textiles, steel and 
nuclear materials, as well as other agreements, for 
instance, the agreement between Russia and Europol, and 
the Science and Technology agreements.  
In addition to the high-level dialogues on energy, foreign, 
security and defence policy, the EU and Russia have 
agreed on a series of joint initiatives in recent years, 
covering a broad range of areas including organised 
crime, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmaments, 
higher education, civil protection, human rights and 
transport.  
5.  Scenarios for 2007 and Beyond 
We identify six scenarios for the post-2007 outlook of 
EU-Russia relations, and evaluate each for their possible 
content and timing.  
Scenario 1: Retire the PCA without 
replacement  
The PCA would be retired because it has not been so 
effective and has also become increasingly obsolete, and 
overtaken by subsequent initiatives. But it would not be 
replaced by a new treaty. 
The hypothesis of retiring the PCA without any 
replacement is not that inconceivable. As already noted, 
in the case of relations with the US, the absence of an 
overarching bilateral treaty has not stood in the way of 
the deepest of alliances. However this scenario has two 
disadvantages in the case of EU-Russian relations. 
First, the PCA today provides the legal basis for EU-
Russian trade relations, which is necessary given that 
Russia is not yet a member of the WTO. While Russia 
may finally accede in 2007, the history of this application 
has been one of continuous rescheduling and delay. The 
present legal basis should in any case not be scrapped 
until its successor is in place.  
Second, in accordance with Art. 106 of the PCA, it would 
require that one party gives six months notice to 
denounce it, i.e. a deliberate negative act, which would be 
open to more negative interpretations than were intended. 
It is one thing for the EU and US not to have a 
comprehensive treaty, with their affairs having always 
been managed without one, but quite another one to scrap 
an existing treaty. It would still be possible to go ahead 
with various sector-specific agreements (as detailed under 
the next scenario) without an overarching treaty, but the 
act of scrapping the PCA without replacing it would risk 
signalling or being interpreted as a political rupture, 
especially in the current uneasy atmosphere between the 
two parties.   
Scenario 2: Extend the status quo  
The PCA would continue to live on, as provided 
automatically by Art. 106, alongside the continuing 
negotiation of operational sectoral agreements, each of 
which would follow its own timetable.  
These sector-specific agreements can be grouped in two 
main categories. The first group links to major steps to 
complete Russia’s participation in global multilateral 
processes, namely through WTO accession, ratification of 
the Energy Charter Treaty and implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol on global warming. All three cases could 
lead on to further related bilateral agreements.  
The second category concerns agreements already 
anticipated under the programmes for the Four Common 
Spaces (as indicated above). Other operational 
agreements can be expected as a result of the work of the 
many dialogue groups already in progress, or currently 
being initiated. The parallel negotiation of multiple 
sector-specific agreements should offer opportunities for 
log-rolling between issues that may be only loosely or 
not all connected. A recent example of log-rolling was 
apparent in the deal in May 2004, when the EU and 
Russia concluded negotiations on Russia’s WTO 
accession,
3 to be followed only a few months later by 
Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on climate 
change, which needed Russia’s approval in order to enter 
into force.   
Retaining the PCA as the political framework at least 
provides a common denominator to uphold that which 
Bordachev calls ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the 
parties. Nonetheless, the substantive business agenda that 
could be pursued under this scenario is very substantial, 
and it is maybe best to do this with minimal politicisation 
in the present circumstances.  
Scenario 3: Extend the status quo, adding a 
Political Declaration on Strategic Partnership  
The previous scenario is retained, with the only 
difference that there is a Political Declaration adopted at 
summit level providing an updating of the de facto system 
as it has emerged and continues to develop.    
The decision to add here a “Political Declaration on 
Strategic Partnership” would be justified as and when a 
new phase in the relationship becomes realistic. 
Conclusion of Russia’s WTO accession and ratification 
of the Energy Charter could be elements conducive for 
this scenario. The PCA could then be retired with dignity. 
Any remaining details of the PCA that were of significant 
operational use after WTO accession could be made the 
subject of specific and technical agreements. The name 
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‘Strategic Partnership’ would signal the change of 
circumstances warranting replacement of the PCA and 
the essential quality of the EU-Russian relationship as 
equal partners within Europe. The EU side would 
presumably be attentive to the political climate within 
Russia, and especially also regarding Russia’s policies 
towards the European ‘near abroad’ states, before 
adopting a text with language about common geo-
strategic purpose and common values uniting the EU and 
Russia. 
There are precedents for such a Political Declaration on 
Strategic Partnership. This is exactly the title of a 
declaration adopted by the EU and India in 2003, which 
was a short document of two pages. It was accompanied 
by a detailed Action Plan not so dissimilar from the 
Roadmaps of the Four Common Spaces. The Indian 
precedent is of course all the more interesting as an 
example of a relationship between the EU and an 
emerging global power, unencumbered by complexities 
of the EU’s integration model. It might also be noted that 
this declaration starts by proclaiming the two parties to be 
the “world’s two biggest democracies”, which is in itself 
an accurate statement. The EU and India seem to have 
got closer and faster to a viable and unambiguous model 
for formalising their cooperation than has been the case 
between the EU and Russia.  
Scenario 4: Replace the PCA with a short 
Treaty of Strategic Partnership  
A simple variant of the preceding scenario would turn the 
Political Declaration into a legally-binding Treaty and 
the PCA would be repealed.  
This supposes identical substance to the previous 
scenario, but gives the top document the form of a treaty, 
rather than a political declaration. In legal terms of course 
the treaty has the highest level of obligation, and in terms 
of procedure requires ratification.  
There are some fundamental disadvantages in this 
scenario. It would be debasing the use of the treaty 
instrument in the present circumstances, if the content 
were merely updating the status quo with language about 
the Four Common Spaces and the Permanent Partnership 
Council procedures. There are signs that Russia would 
like a new treaty simply for reasons of diplomatic 
prestige – one could call it ‘trophy diplomacy’ or 
‘cosmetic diplomacy’. It is hard to see what interest the 
EU could find in this, unless the treaty marked a real 
rapprochement politically.  
Being a treaty, there would have to be ratification by 
parliaments on both sides, including all EU member 
states. The experience gained with the extension of the 
PCA to the 10 EU new member states suggests that 
ratification of any new legally binding document that was 
not convincingly advantageous could encounter political 
obstacles. Potentially divisive issues could be 
downplayed or bypassed in a political declaration. In a 
treaty, these would have to be addressed, for the fairly 
straightforward reason that the text would otherwise be 
blocked in national parliaments, or already at the 
negotiation table in anticipation of such difficulties. The 
EU of 25 member states has seen a quantitative and 
qualitative change in the facility with which treaties may 
be passed, especially with Russia given the sensitivities 
of the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact member states. It 
is all too easy to imagine some emotionally charged 
political incident occurring sometime during the two or 
more years of the ratification procedure just at the time 
when a parliament is preparing to vote on the new treaty. 
A single parliament’s negative vote would then block the 
entire process. This is itself not so much an unhealthy 
prospect, since it is the essence of democratic procedure, 
but the prospect of possible difficulties is also a reality 
check. Treaties are meant to be the highest form of 
internationally binding agreement. It is better for them to 
be reserved for texts whose content and indeed political 
intent truly warrant such status. 
Scenario 5: Replace the PCA with a 
comprehensive Treaty of Strategic 
Partnership  
A comprehensive new treaty, replacing the PCA, would 
give binding form to the subject matter of the Four 
Common Spaces, including annexed protocols with 
various sector-specific agreements, and updated 
institutional provisions. 
The form and substance of this scenario comes closest to 
Nadia Arbatova’s preferred option. Although she terms it 
a ‘modified’ and ‘modernised’ PCA, the content of the 
new PCA version would in fact be a new treaty that 
integrates, specifies and upgrades the general provisions 
contained in the Road Maps, and tops them up with two 
titles on ‘General Principles’ and ‘Political Dialogue’, 
and two separate protocols on implementation of the 
agreement and on Kaliningrad.
4  
This scenario takes into account significant developments 
since 1997, both in the Four Common Spaces, and 
institutionally through the Permanent Partnership Council 
established in 2005. The new agreement would, like the 
old PCA, be a treaty. It would consolidate and improve 
on these developments, and reflect also changes in the 
EU’s competences and policies over the last decade, such 
as in the justice and home affairs and foreign, security 
and defence domains.  
The most serious problem with this scenario is precisely 
the opposite of that of the preceding scenario offering a 
short treaty. This comprehensive treaty would involve 
lengthy negotiations to progress beyond the content of the 
old PCA and the newer Four Common Spaces. The 
process has the hazard of having to bring so many 
sectoral negotiations to a point of maturity at the same 
time. It would then be subject to the long ratification 
delay before entry into force. The overall result would be 
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vulnerable to two problems: inflexibility and rapid 
obsolescence of the substance, and risks of rejection of 
ratification in some member state.   
Scenario 6: A Treaty of Strategic Union  
This would be a short treaty, but a very ambitious one, 
raising the level of mutual commitment to deep 
cooperation in the affairs of Europe to the highest 
possible level. This is signaled by the name – Treaty of 
Strategic Union.   
This scenario adopts the name ‘Strategic Union’ as 
proposed by Timofei Bordachev. The role of this Treaty 
would be to do on an all-European scale between the EU 
and Russia something comparable to what the French-
German reconciliation and their bilateral treaty has done 
in Western Europe. Of course this analogy cannot be 
taken too far. Yet there are certain properties that the 
Treaty of Strategic Union might aim at, which the 
French-German model of the Elysée Treaty  brings to 
mind (see Box 4). These include a partnership of equals, 
a determination to replace old enmities with a totally new 
paradigm of common purpose, the building of complete 
trust on fundamental matters, and search for full 
agreement in as many domains of common interest as 
possible. For Russia, this new state of affairs would mean 
also dissolving any sense of exclusion from European 
society, and for the EU and Russia to be able to observe 
that together they are Europe, and working according to 
common ideas and even ideals. 
Today this can be no more than a mental exercise, but it 
may still be a useful one at a time when EU-Russian 
relations appear to be moving further away from this 
ideal case and to become more tense, without any sense 
of how to reverse this trend. 
There are major prerequisites for achieving this ideal 
Europe, on both sides. The EU, for its part, would have to 
build up its capacity as strategic international actor, for 
example with at least implantation of the draft 
Constitution’s proposal for a foreign minister and 
enhanced security and defence capabilities, and perhaps 
also a single seat in the UN Security Council. 
Russia for its part would have to become a real 
democracy and redefine its security doctrine. Russia’s 
leadership says that there are many forms of democracy, 
and Russia has its own model. This argument fails to 
convince. While it is true that democracy has many 
forms, there are some necessary conditions, such as a 
truly multi-party political structure, media freedoms and 
an independent judiciary, which today Russia does not 
meet.  
Russia’s current security doctrine, as defined recently by 
Sergey Ivanov (Box 1), would have to be revised. Of 
course, it is not so difficult to replace one piece of paper 
with another. But more fundamental is the matter of the 
prevailing mind-set of the governing class, and of the so-
called ‘power ministries’. These qualitative changes 
would clear the way at last for resolution of the so-called 
‘frozen conflicts’.    
The new treaty would see the two parties constantly 
seeking to form common positions on matters of foreign 
and security policy. Russia would find satisfaction in 
being co-promoter of European interests and values. This 
would be the opposite to Russia using its considerable 
capacity as ‘spoiler’ in international affairs, by taking 
positions that complicate the search for international 
consensus, while clothing such positions in the language 
of national interest.  
It would be premature at this time to try to anticipate 
what the Strategic Union would do. The essential point is 
that it would get started with leaderships that were 
determined to achieve certain overarching objectives, and 
to respect certain guiding principles. The precise 
mechanisms and actions would follow in accordance with 
the concrete problems of the time. The French-German 
relationship was founded by Adenauer and de Gaulle, and 
greatly deepened for its European content by Kohl and 
Mitterrand. The Treaty of Strategic Union would be born 
of enlightened and indeed visionary future leadership.  
Box 4. The Elysée Treaty [extracts]  
General De Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and 
Dr Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal German 
Republic, (…)  
Convinced that the reconciliation of the German People 
and the French People, ending a centuries-old rivalry, 
constitutes an historic event which profoundly transforms 
the relations between the two peoples (…)  
Recognising that a reinforcing of cooperation between 
the two countries constitutes an indispensable stage on 
the way to a united Europe, which is the aim of the two 
people (…)  
Have given their agreement to the organisation and 
principles of cooperation between the two States such as 
they are set out in the Treaty signed this day (…): 
The two Governments will consult before any decision on 
all important questions of foreign policy and, in the first 
place, on questions of common interest, with a view to 
reaching as far as possible an analogous position. (…) 
The two Governments will study jointly the means of 
reinforcing their cooperation in other important sectors of 
economic policy, such as agricultural and forestry policy, 
energy, the problems of communications and transport 
and industrial development, within the framework of the 
Common Market, as well as the policy of export credits. 
(…) 
In the field of strategy and tactics, the competent 
authorities of the two countries will endeavour to bring 
their doctrines closer together with a view to reaching 
common conceptions. (…) 
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6.  Conclusions: Why, what and when?  
Why? The EU and Russia need an ordered relationship 
because they are ever-closer neighbours, and they are 
Europe’s only two major powers, both with aspirations to 
be global actors as well. Their list of common concerns 
and interests is extremely long and inescapable. In 
general terms the EU wants its big neighbour to be the 
friendly and reliable partner, both on concrete matters of 
which energy supplies is the most important, and on 
matters of political values for both internal and external 
affairs. Russia wants to confirm and deepen its presence 
and identity in modern Europe, but without being tied to 
the EU’s all-entangling mass of legal and normative rules 
and regulations.     
What? The model of the comprehensive treaty, covering 
all sectors of mutual interest in legally binding form, 
ratified by the parliaments of all EU member states, is ill-
adapted to the needs of the EU-Russia relationship. The 
comprehensive treaty model is suited to the case where 
the partner state wishes to accede to the EU, since in 
these circumstances the permanent stock of laws of the 
EU provides a mutually acceptable anchor. However, for 
Russia, and other cases such as the United States, this 
form of agreement has serious disadvantages. It is 
extremely rigid, given that the process of negotiating 
across the board on all economic, political and security 
matters requires that many issues are brought to the point 
of agreement at the same time. And this has to be 
followed by the heaviest of ratification procedures on the 
EU side, which experience shows can take up to three 
years, with non-negligible risks that a single member 
state’s parliament might wreck the endeavour right at the 
end of the laborious process.   
Far more realistic and efficient would seem to be the 
model of negotiating multiple sector-specific agreements, 
each adapted to the most appropriate timing and format. 
There could be strategically important agreements for 
free trade after Russia’s WTO accession and on energy 
questions. There are so many issues of mutual interest 
that one can also envisage loosely connected packages of 
agreements, allowing for the advantages of some log-
rolling (i.e. a balanced set of advantages between several 
agreements of unequal interest to each party). This would 
be somewhat similar to what has emerged as the EU-
Swiss model of multiple agreements, more than the 
Europe Agreement model with the EU’s accession 
candidates. The PCA started as an experimental weak 
derivative of the Europe Agreement model, and the 
experiment failed basically because Russia does not fit 
into the mould of a long-range accession candidate. The 
successive strategy documents and roadmaps that have 
emerged in recent years represent a search for a better 
model, but they too have failed to satisfy.    
In the longer run, the time may and hopefully will come 
when a deeper and more mature relationship can be 
established. The only certainty is that the large majority 
of the Russian population will carry on living in Europe. 
This inescapable co-habitation should lead at some stage 
to a noble formula, possibly a Treaty of Strategic Union. 
Even this, however, should probably not be in the shape 
of a huge comprehensive treaty document. Rather, it 
should consist of some basic institutional provisions and 
a solemn commitment to fundamental political and 
societal objectives, for which the French-German Treaty 
of 1963 offers a very different model. The wisdom of this 
model is that there can be historic moments when 
political leaders can take steps to consolidate trust and 
chart a fresh course for history. But trust cannot be 
legislated. Either it becomes an evident fact, or it does not 
exist. For modern Europe this would have to be based on 
deeply shared common values.  
When? We therefore argue in favour of a three-stage 
scenario for the years and decades ahead. In the short run, 
the accent should be on pragmatic, tangible, sector-
specific agreements. It is clear that the EU and Russia do 
not need to rush into making a new agreement, since 
there is automatic extension of the status quo after the 
tenth anniversary on 1 December 2007, and therefore no 
problem of a legal void. There are also several reasons 
why it would be better not to be hasty. Russia’s WTO 
accession is still not decided, and this is the key to further 
developments of the economic side. There are important 
discussions currently underway over energy matters, 
including whether Russian ratifies the Energy Charter, 
and this is equally key to further developments in this 
sector. There are very sensitive issues surrounding the 
‘frozen conflicts’, and that of Transnistria comes closer 
now to EU interests with the accession of Romania in 
2007 or 2008. Resolution of this irritating anomaly in the 
neighbourhood would be helpful to creating fresh 
conditions for cooperation. Russia has presidential 
elections in 2008, for which President Putin cannot stand 
according to the Constitution. It might be prudent to wait 
and see what the intentions of his successor might be, 
thus to see the answer to the 2008 question, before 
tackling the so-called ‘2007 question’. In practical terms, 
the recommended Political Declaration on Strategic 
Partnership might best wait until after the 2008 
presidential elections in Russia.  
Just how distant is the prospect of the model Treaty of 
Strategic Union? 2010, 2015, 2020? Nobody knows. 
However, conventional opinion often does err on the side 
of extrapolating the present for too long, while 
underestimating the chances for breaks in trend. On the 
EU side, the ongoing dynamics of its foreign and security 
policies seem quite robust, and not really damaged by the 
failure of the Constitution. The expectations-capability 
gap on the side of EU foreign policy may become 
smaller. On the Russian side, it would seem quite 
possible that with growing economic well-being the 
people will come to demand a real democracy and an 
equitable and efficient rule of law. The values gap may 
also close in due course, perhaps sooner than expected.   
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Annex 1 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Signed June 1994, in force since December 1997 
    Article     (no.) 
  Preamble 1  (1) 
Title I  General principles  2- 5   (4) 
Title II  Political dialogue  6- 9  (4) 
Title III  Trade in goods  10- 22  (3) 
Title IV  Provisions on business and investment 
Chapter I: Labour conditions (Art. 23-27) 
Chapter II: Conditions affecting the establishment and operation 
of companies (Art. 28-35) 
Chapter III: Cross-border supply of services (Art. 36-43) 
Chapter IV: General provisions (Art. 44-51) 
23- 51  (29) 
Title V  Payments and capital  52  (1) 
Title VI  Competition; intellectual, industrial and commercial property 
protection; legislative cooperation 
53- 55  (3) 
Title VII  Economic cooperation  56- 83  (28) 
Title VIII  Cooperation on prevention of illegal activities  84  (1) 
Title IX  Cultural cooperation  85  (1) 
Title X  Financial cooperation  86- 89  (4) 
Title XI  Institutional, general and final provisions  90- 112  (23) 
      
Annex 1  Indicative list of advantages granted by Russia to the countries of 
the former USSR in areas covered by this Agreement  
  
Annex 2  Derogations from Article 15 (quantitative restrictions)     
Annex 3  Community reservations in accordance with Article 28(2)     
Annex 4  Russian reservations in accordance with Article 28(3)     
Annex  5  Cross-border supply of services list of services for which the 
parties shall grant most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment 
  
Annex 6  Definitions in relation to financial services     
Annex 7  Financial services     
Annex 8   Provisions in relation to Articles 34 and 38     
Annex  9  Transitional period for provisions on competition and for the 
introduction of quantitative restrictions 
  
Annex  10  Protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property 
referred to in Article 54 
  
      
Protocol 1  On the establishment of a coal and steel contact group     
Protocol 2  On mutual administrative assistance for the correct application of 
customs regulation 
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Annex 2 
The Common Strategy on Russia 
Adopted in June 1999 
Preamble 
 
PART I: VISION OF THE EU FOR ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA 
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES 
1.  Consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Russia 
2.  Integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space 
3.  Co-operation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond 
4.  Common challenges on the European continent 
INSTRUMENTS AND MEANS 
1.  General provisions 
2.  The Council, the Commission and Member States  
3.  Coordination 
4.  Implementation and review 
5.  Cooperation with Russia 
6.  Specific initiatives 
 
PART II: AREAS OF ACTION 
1.  Consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Russia 
a.  strengthen the rule of law and public institutions 
b.  to strengthen civil society 
2.  Integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space 
a.  consolidate the process of economic reform in Russia 
b.  support the integration of Russia into a wider area of economic cooperation in Europe 
c.  lay the basis for a social market economy 
3.  Co-operation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond 
a.  reinforcing political dialogue 
b.  Russia’s place in the European security architecture 
c.  preventive diplomacy 
4.  Common challenges on the European continent 
a.  energy and nuclear safety 
b.  environment and health 
c.  fight against organised crime, money laundering and illicit traffic in human beings and drugs; judicial cooperation 
d.  regional and cross-border cooperation and infrastructure 
 
PART III: SPECIFIC INITIATIVES 
•  Political and security dialogue 
•  Dialogue on economic questions 
•  Trade and investment 
•  Fight against organised crime 
•  Twinning programmes 
•  Exchange programmes for students and young scientists 
•  Establishment of a viable health and welfare system 
 
PART IV 
DURATION 
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Annex 3 
The Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the 
Russian Federation and the European Union 
Presented in October 1999 
 
1.  Strategic character of Russian- EU partnership. 
2.  Enlarging the format and improving the efficiency of the political dialogue. 
3.  Development of mutual trade and investments. 
4.  Co-operation in the financial field. 
5.  Securing the Russian interests in an expanded European Union. 
6.  Development of the pan-European co-operation infrastructure. 
7.  Co-operation in the field of science and technologies, protection of the intellectual property rights. 
8.  Transboundary co-operation. 
9.  Development of the legal basis for co-operation. Approximation of the economic legislation and technical 
standards. 
10. Co-operation in the law enforcement sphere. 
11. The role of business circles in co-operation development. 
12. Ensuring the implementation of the strategy inside Russia. 
 
Annex 4 
Road maps for the Four ‘Common Spaces’ 
Adopted in May 2005 
 
THE COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE  
1. Trade and economic cooperation  
1.1. Regulatory Dialogue on industrial products 
1.2. Public procurement  
1.3. Intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights  
1.4 Competition  
1.5. Investment  
1.6. Enterprise policy and economic dialogue  
1.7 Interregional and cross-border cooperation  
1.8. Financial services (banking, insurance, securities)  
1.9. Accounting/auditing and statistics  
1.10. Agriculture, forestry, timber, fisheries. Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures  
2. Trade facilitation and customs  
3. Networks 
3.1 Telecommunications, information society and e-business  
3.2. Transport  
4. Energy  
5. Space  
6. Environment 16 | Emerson, Tassinari & Vahl 
 
THE COMMON SPACE OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE  
1. Freedom  
1.1 Movement of persons, readmission  
1.2 Border issues  
1.3 Migration policy  
1.4 Asylum policy  
2. Security  
2.1 Counter terrorism.  
2.2 Security of documents.  
2.3 Transnational organised crime. 
2.4 Anti-money laundering 
2.5 Narcotic drug problem 
2.6 Trafficking in human beings  
2.7 Corruption  
2.8 Trafficking in stolen vehicles and items of cultural and historic value  
3. Justice  
3.1 Judicial system  
3.2 Criminal matters  
3.3 Civil matters  
4. Monitoring mechanism  
 
COMMON SPACE OF EXTERNAL SECURITY  
1. Objectives  
2. Scope  
2.1. International scene  
2.2. Terrorism  
2.3. Non-proliferation of WMD, export control, disarmament  
2.4. Crisis management  
2.5. Civil protection  
 
COMMON SPACE OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, INCLUDING CULTURAL ASPECTS  
1. Research, science and technology  
2. Education  
3. Culture  
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ANNEX 5 
Draft Transit Protocol of the Energy Charter (extracts) 
 
Part III - Specific provisions 
Article 8 - Utilisation of available capacity 
 
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that owners or operators of Energy Transport Facilities under its 
jurisdiction will negotiate in good faith with any other Contracting Parties or Entities of Contracting Parties 
requesting access to and use of Available Capacity for Transit. Such negotiations shall be based on transparent 
procedures, on commercial terms, and be non-discriminatory as to the origin, destination or ownership of the 
Energy Materials and Products.  
 
2. Contracting parties shall ensure that owners or operators shall be obliged to provide a duly substantiated 
explanation in case of refusing access to and use of Available Capacity for Transit.  
 
Part V - Implementation and Compliance 
 
Article 20 - Regional Economic Integration Organization 
 
1. For the purposes of this Protocol, the "Area" of a Contracting Party referred to in Article 7(10) (a) of the Treaty 
shall, as regards Contracting Parties which are members of a Regional Economic Integration Organization, mean 
the area to which the treaty establishing such a Regional Economic Integration Organization applies.  
 
2. A Regional Economic Integration Organization undertakes to ensure that its provisions treat Energy Materials 
and Products originating in another Contracting Party and in free circulation in its Area no less favourably than 
Energy Materials and Products originating in its constituent member-states. Furthermore, the rules of a Regional 
Economic Integration Organization shall provide an overall standard at least equivalent to that resulting from the 
provisions of the Protocol. 
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
 Research Institutes (ENEPRI) The  Wider  Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South-East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 